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DAVID BRAINE'S PROJECT:
THE HUMAN PERSONI
David Burrell, C.S.c.

The author of The Reality of Time and the Existence of God turns his critical conceptual acumen to finding an intellectually viable path between the current
polarities of dualism and materialism. By considering human beings as language-using animals he can critically appraise "representational" views of
concept formation, as well as show how current "research programs" which
presuppose a "materialist" basis stem from an unwitting adoption of a dualist picture of mind and body. His alternative is rooted in classical thinkers
like Aquinas and responsive to the critiques of Wittgenstein, yet constructive
in ways in which those critiques failed to be. This essay aims to help readers
undertake a taxing inquiry by guiding them through its main theses.

This paper will have a strange rhetorical mode: meet my friend,
David Braine. And in introducing you to my friend, I shall explain why
he has become my friend, which involved (among other things) helping
me unravel a conundrum which arose in the course of a philosophy colloquium a couple of years ago. But first, David Braine. Recently he has
been Gifford Fellow and Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of
Aberdeen, with a background in physics, history, and philosophy in
Oxford from 1958 to 1965. The victim of an auto accident in 1977 which
inflicted a spinal injury, David has had to work under incredibly constrained conditions since that time, though he is supported by a small
community of students who assist him, and served ably each day by
skilled persons from the Scottish home health care system. I was initially taken with his earlier volume (1988): The Reality of Time and the
Existence of God, though I recognized that its inherent difficulty would
frighten off many a prospective reader, so in my review (in Faith and
Philosophy 7 [1990] 362-65) tried to walk people through the rich texture
of his arguments. What struck me most was his manner of argumentation: thoroughly contemporary yet able to avail itself of the riches of a
multi-layered philosophical tradition. That approach has the advantage
of being able to see through and often cut through current fads; its price
is a text freighted with allusion and never simply one-dimensional.
Moreover, that volume presented itself as the first of a trilogy which
promised to challenge views in metaphysics, philosophy of human
beings and language, and epistemology. The volume I wish to focus on
today, entitled The Human Person, was announced earlier as: "Man:
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Animal open to the infinite." So the canvas is large, yet the arguments,
as we shall see, are intricate.
The conundrum which this volume addressed for me was provoked
when a colleague introduced our local philosophy colloquium to "cognitive science" a few years ago, using something called "folk psychology"
as a springboard. I didn't know much about what people called "cognitive science," though I had worked with an NSF-sponsored research
group on "artificial intelligence" some years back, but what made it
worse was that I couldn't recognize myself as a "folk psychologist"
either. Nor, any of the novelists whom I respected as narrators of human
action: D. H. Lawrence, Toni Morrison, Leo Tolstoy, Naguib Mahfouzto name a representative list. In fact, I recalled at that time a strategy
which I had learned from philosophical mentors like J.L. Austin, Ryle,
Strawson, and Wittgenstein, about the logical peculiarities involved in
ascribing actions to human beings. And as well as I could understand
the supposed vagaries of "folk psychology," the accounts these philosophers gave of ascription, as well as the practice of my cherished novelists,
seemed to escape most all of them. 2 So I was thrilled to find David
Braine beginning his extended essay with a reference to Austin, Ryle,
and the later Wittgenstein, noting their contribution to his own formation in these questions, but also acknowledging that they had eschewed,
and quite deliberately so, a search for explanation. Science, in fact, was
not their paradigm for understanding, which it explicitly is for "cognitive science." One way of stating the aim of Braine's book is that it is to
address the issue of explanation which they left hanging, but to do so in
a idiom which does justice to the subjects involved-human persons.
I had also sensed some affinity between the opposition-folk psychology / cognitive science-and Wilfrid Sellars' celebrated manifest/ scientific images. In elaborating that difference, Sellars had noted how
explaining why gases expand when heated had to involve more than
covering laws, and in fact required a hypothetical step: were gases so
constituted as to allow Newton's laws to offer an account why expansion occurred under heating, we would have an explanation. And if
something of this sort worked for gases, why not for thoughts? We all
know why not, of course, since thoughts are intentional in character,
with this curious of- or about-structure, which decomposition into molecules doesn't help to explain. For Sellars, thoughts become roles in a
working language, for which he could never find a correlate susceptible
of "scientific explanation," for human society and its norms (for him) are
adumbrated in the inherent normativity of speech, which is not itself
susceptible of assimilation to the "scientific image." Does it then belong
to the "manifest image," or could it be that explanation in human affairs
resists such bifurcation?
So Sellars' initial dichotomy may help us to a more adequate diagnosis of the difficulty that is emerging: is everything we confront or wish
to know better to be known better by presuming that the language of
our initial confrontation is a commonsensical one which needs to be
replaced by an explanatory one? It was, of course, this presumption
which the later Wittgenstein, along with Ryle and Austin, combatted in
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various therapeutic ways, leading us to appreciate how sophisticated
"ordinary" modes of expression can be in certain domains, and so more
in need of explicating than of replacing. Yet, as Braine remarks, their
work proved to be more destructive of inappropriate explanatory paradigms and of an apriori insensitivity to "ordinary" discourse than it was
constructive. In any case, it did not eradicate the impulse to explain
human behavior, and one sign of that fact is a curious current amnesia
regarding their animadversions, along with an entire research project
proceeding according to paradigms they would have found odd: "manifest/ scientific image," "folk psychology" /" cognitive science."
David Braine wants to bridge the gap between the generations by
acknowledging that one cannot suppress the lure of explaining, but that
the issue is how to do so. Rather than accepting uncritically a specific
"scientific" paradigm, he begins by asking what it is that is to be
explained, and given that fact, how one ought best to go about it. (Here
we see the first sign of his radically Aristotelian orientation: different
kinds of things may have to be explained differently.) We must begin,
he insists, with human persons (rather than with "mental events") and
their characteristic modes of acting, and press for a non-dualistic
account of them. To get a proper focus on the landscape and to clarify
his goal with a diagnosis of the difficulties to be unravelled, he details
the structural similarity between dualist and naturalist accounts. Recall
what seemed to remove thoughts from the "scientific image" -their
aboutness. The temptation for one who wishes to bring them into line is
to focus on such characteristics and ask how they can be translated into
a language amenable to scientific explanation. This will involve a strategy of reifying things identified as "mental states" or "events," and then
trying to identify them with states of the brain or another purportedly
physical part of humans. 3 So if Descartes is the father of dualists, he
becomes the grandfather of "eliminative materialists," for they must
eliminate what their fathers postulated, yet in doing so they leave the
form of analysis relatively untouched.
Braine's alternative seeks above all to eschew the inner/outer divide,
especially with regard to paradigms of explanation. So he will replace
Descartes' demarcation into two proper domains of explanation-spirit
and body, with Aristotle's strate gem that there are in fact different kinds
of things to be explained in a manner proper to their differences. So
Braine puts forth his approach as holistic, in a way which appeals to the
converging indicators in our midst which question the utility of
Descartes' demarcation." As he puts it: "dualist and materialist alike
are committed not only to a mythology of inner experiences and 'acts of
will' as things we must, in their view attribute to or predicate of human
beings. But also they are committed to this mythology as part of a more
general mythology of 'events', 'states', and 'processes', as objects to be
the terms of causal relations-it always being one real object (say, an
event) which causes another real object (a different event)"(59). In this
way, "regularity theories of causation conspire together with the
requirements of the dualist/materialist account of man and animals to
make one regard states and events as objects in a metaphysical sense
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and the only real causes, if real causes exist-[thusl reducing agent-causation to event causation"(60).
According to the more holistic paradigm of substance-causation,
moreover, the search for a properly descriptive language will offer the
key to what is properly explanatory. And for human beings and animals, that description "is irreducibly holistic or hybrid, [with] reference
to the mental and the physical inextricable from each other within
it"(61). Nor is it simply that both languages are needed, but that they
interpenetrate: it is crucial to human beings' being the linguistic animals
we are that we are of flesh and blood! In this sense, then, "it is quite
wrong to speak of this bodily being, animal or human, as essentially a
'material entity' or 'material body'."(63). Such opening salvos require,
of course, that he show what an explanation of this holistic, "substance"
sort would look like; and not merely negatively (as Austin, Ryle, or
Wittgenstein) but constructively as well. That is, besides showing that
event-paradigms won't do it, he must offer alternatives which will satisfy our demand for explanation, showing how it is that "intention is not
the extrinsic cause of certain physical bodily movements, but is the
mode of the exercise of causality involved when an animal or human
being executes a bodily action intentionally." In this way, "the human
being or animal, acting according to its nature in the mode of causal
agency proper to it, ... acts bodily in the world"(68). As one might suspect, his guides in this enterprise will be Aristotle above all, with assistance at crucial points from Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty; and for
philosophers that may be one of the more arresting features of his
extended project.
Once he has shown how dualists and materialists share a dualistic
paradigm for explanatory discourse regarding human beings, Braine
constructs his alternative "substance" account in stepwise fashion. He
begins with perception, displaying it "as a direct cognitive relation with
the world," relating "an active exploring animal to a world perceived as
a field of action"(69). This will involve deconstructing the '"cinematograph model' of perception"(75) for one in which "neither the visual
world nor the tactile world is a thing previously given to which the
other is an extra. Rather there is one world within which I move, see,
and feel" (75)-language reminiscent of the work of Oliver Sacks. In a
world in which substances are the primary agents there is no neutral
perception-language; rather there are diverse uses of the verb 'to see', as
Austin was wont to remind us. Or following Merleau-Ponty, "the intentional object of .. perception is a real object ... to which behaviour is
adapted [in such a way] that there is no way of logically segregating or
isolating knowledge of the 'experience' in perception from knowledge of
this nested ness or from knowledge of this relation"(97).5 In this way,
perception is presented as the act of "a wandering, exploring, active
agent" and not "that of a pure observer, a mind in abstraction from
physical activity" (131). Indeed, the purpose of these two chapters on
perception is to make conceptual room for an "irreducible kind of
agency, a kind characteristic of animals and human beings with the
mental and physical integrated and inseparable"(132).
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The following two chapters (4 and 5) put that effort in a larger context
by linking such agency with a distinct mode of being proper to humans
and animals, recalling us to Strawson's early work with P-predicates.
Then Braine will be poised to argue for the primacy of agent- over
event-causation, at least in the case of humans and animals (Ch. 6), and
from there to challenge any presumption in favor of mechanistic explanation as well as argue for the possible autonomy of teleological explanation (Ch. 7). That will give him the conceptual tools to construct his
"first refutation of mechanism," arguing for psychophysical unity at the
level of explanation (Ch. 8), and completing part I with an overview of
the community between human beings and other animals (Ch. 9):
"these realities compel us to treat both human beings and other higher
animals as wholes"(339). As if that did not suffice to make good his
promise of a constructive alternative account of the agency proper to
human beings, part II moves from the perspective of what we hold in
common with higher animals to treat "the human being as spirit:
human transcendence revealed in language"(343). Here a consideration
of the suppleness of human linguistic response (Ch. 10) sets him up for
two chapters on the "simpleness of thought," (to use a medieval idiom),
one phenomenological (Ch. 11), the other explanatory (Ch. 12): "the second refutation of mechanism: linguistic understanding and thinking
have no bodily organ"(447). These are followed by a non-dualistic
account of soul (Ch. 13), offering both phenomenological and explanatory uses of the expression, culminating with two chapters on the transcendence proper to human beings: the first using the language of 'soul'
(Ch. 14) and the second casting the argument in terms proper to human
being as such (Ch. 15).
It would be out of the question to canvass his entire project, but I shall
give some soundings of the key deconstructive chapter (6) with its constructive complement (7), where he tries to overcome current fascination
with event-causation and offer as its replacement a proposal introducing a different mode of causality proper to agents. Then I shall assess
the force of his considerations regarding the capacities endemic to the
human use of language (Ch. 10), noting how these reinforce his earlier
remarks about the mode of causality proper to agents; and finish by
explicating his use of 'soul' in both its phenomenological and explanatory senses, showing how he carries though this Aristotelian project in a
nondualist fashion. The recurring theme which shapes his argumentation regards the need to explain human agency. Just as perception for
animals can only be understood in the context of their active exploration
of the world about them, so human intentional activity, as evidenced
both in the range of operations endemic to language as well as our
capacity to harness them to make a single point, manages to focus what
otherwise would remain disparate. It is this anti-entropic, unifying
character of human activity (at its best) which argues to the need for a
unified subject of such activity to which it can justly be attributed. And
what gives unity to the human person in its activity must also be the
source of that activity. Here is where the Aristotelian notion of psyche,
adopted and modified by Aquinas as a soul subsistent bodily for the his-
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tory of the individual human person, can be called upon. For it is this
principle which will account for specifically human activity, and by its
relative transcendence of bodily conditions, open the person for direct
relationship with God, and so for the gift of eternal life. That is the
direction implicit in Braine's talk of "human transcendence," though his
philosophical argumentation carries one but to the threshold of such
positive affirmations. Indeed, as we shall see, his argument can be pursued independent of the use of soul (or psyche), though not of the need
for a principle to explain the activity proper to human agents.
That need to explain activity fuels his scrutiny of the metaphysics
endemic to much current discourse purporting to explain human action,
which he dubs "the mythology of events and states as objectsl/(204). He
reminds us that "the primary way of referring to events is not by means
of noun expressions such as 'Alfred's striking of Bridget with his fist in
the sitting room at 2 p.m.', but by means of propositional expressions
such as 'Alfred struck Bridget with his fist in the sitting room at 2
p.m."'(204). The form of such statements calls our attention to the primacy of the person whose name take the subject place, and serves
Braine's attempt to supplant a vaguely "platonist" ontology which
grants equal status to substances, properties, relations, and events, with
an Aristotelian one which privileges substances as that of which actions
are predicated. He takes time to answer some of Davidson's objections
to the capacity of sentences adequately to identify events, noting that
they do so in use (206), but goes on to question the utility of introducing
"a theory of properties or features as objects as if it were explanatory,"
reminding us that "'object' is not a genus, and that the things we speak
of belong to different categories, and that the nature and criteria of identity for subordinate categories ... require to be explained in terms of
statements about more fundamental categories" (21 0).
Indeed, "the grand mistake involved in the mythology we are attacking is the mistake of explaining what it is for Smith's car to collide with
the wall by saying that it consists in the existence of this object, the collision which Smith's car and the wall engage in"(211). It is that mythology which leads us to "ask the peculiar question as to what is the relation
between an agent and his or her actionl/(225). The natural response to
that "seems to be that the agent is the logical subject of the action and
that the action is predicated of the agent.I/ In that way, "causativity is
internal to the sense of the verb phrase in such predications as aspect
and tense are internal to itl/(226). Braine suggests that the alternative
way of "thinking of the agent and the action as both objects, distinct
objects between which there is a relationl/(226), has its roots "in a certain
way of presenting Humean theories of explanationl/(220), whereas
explaining the event as "the outcome of the action and interaction of different natures at work in the world [makes it] natural to envisage different modes of causal action, and there is no temptation to be captivated
by the physical case exemplified by the billiard ballI/ (224). Furthermore,
"this accords with the commonsense: my being the cause of my kicking
the football is nothing other than the action's being 'from me', nothing
other than its being me that kicked the footballl/(226). If that's the way it
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is with full-bodied human action, it seems gratuitous to object "that the
remark that I caused the action has no explanatory power, because it
does not imply a connection between one event and another in a context
of circumstances in which the later event, independently specifiable, follows according to law from the earlier event ... since no respectable
proof has been offered of the doctrine that explanations ... must take this
form"(227).
So we see that Braine is arguing for replacing a reductive picture
"that causal connection is between events or states each of which is a
'logically distinct existence', [with one of] causal agents with different
types of disposition entering into explanation in different ways"(224). It
is this Aristotelian methodological presumption which governs both his
deconstructive and his constructive efforts, and why it is crucial to his
extended argument to "dethrone events," in order to "be able to see
human and animal life as focalized upon the human beings and animals
concerned, not only at the level of experience and description, but also at
the level of explanation and reality"(227). Indeed, calling into question a
single paradigm for causality will allow him to recover the attention
which Austin, Ryle, and the later Wittgenstein gave to description and
especially to ascription of actions, and then proceed to a manner of
explaining which need not postulate a chasm between "manifest and scientific images" in the explanation of human action. This will involve
rescuing "causal agency, which is a kind of criterion of being real, from
the prison of mechanism and accord it its full generality, so that the prototypical examples of causal agents will be, not billiard balls, but persons and animals exercising a mode of causality which is intentional or
directed" (235). The unflattering "prison of mechanism" implies a challenge: "there is no epistemological reason to suppose that a tendency or
disposition towards an end has to be conceived of as a state of some
apparatus or mechanism, whether material or immaterial"(231). The
background is "Aristotle's conception of state or (in modern parlance)
'disposition' (hexis, dynamis) which was quite open and not at all tied to
the idea of being the resultant of the state of an apparatus" (232).
This challenge is integral to Braine's project, so he must go on to
explain why it is initially so arresting. He feels that "the compulsion
often felt towards mechanical models" springs not only "from misunderstandings of what is involved in teleological explanations" but also
from "certain false presumptions of a quasi-logical kind: ... the sense that
any tendency, disposition, or state even if initially understood teleologically must be ultimately describable as the state of some system, apparatus, set-up, or mechanism, whether material or mental"(243). He continues: "the 'real' is then supposed to need to bear some analogy or likeness to such physical structures [so that] unless predications or ascriptions of states or dispositions involve something about some such 'substantial' set-up ... the predication or ascription must be empty." And
once that presumption is granted, it will also be presumed that when
such states or dispositions "are historically explanatory of some physical
movement, this is because the state which they denote (qua state of a setup or apparatus) is mechanically causative of what they explain"(244).
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Yet allowing oneself to be mesmerized by such a concatenation of presumptions evacuates the kind of causality peculiar to intentional agents
and offers to "explain" it in ways which offer no specific illumination
regarding such actions. So, for example, he reminds us that it belongs to
our grasp of Illan understanding of a proof of Pythagoras' theorem' that
the person who has it should in principle be able to explain to another
person how to prove this theorem," yet what is added "by bringing in a
theory of structured states of brain or soul and showing how these
might be mechanically productive of the same sound-effects from the
person's mouth'(246)? "There indeed has to be something about the
person which makes it true that he or she has a belief, or has understanding, ... but this does not have to be represented as picturable"(247).
This sets his task: "to envisage ... the way ascriptions of perception, sensation, emotion and intention have meaning independently of this form
of material rooting" (248).
The final two chapters of Part I of The Human Person pull together
these threads into an account of "holistic explanation" which accepts
human beings and animals as "basic entities." For they are the subjects
of statements "which involve teleology ineliminably" (288), and so quite
naturally exclude explanation in terms of mechanisms. Yet to say that
they are basic entities and so need to be considered holistically need not
militate against their being considered in terms of their physical parts, so
long as it be understood that "in these physical treatments we are
abstracting certain aspects of human and animal life ... from the life and
behaviour of human beings or animals as wholes which can only be
understood holistically, teleologically-understood as organic psychophysical unities"(250). Once again, the guide is Aristotle, and
notably the "reciprocity between the macroscopic and the minute ...
which is the hallmark of Aristotle's conception of nature, and .,. provides the key to the understanding of human beings and animals" (261).
That is, for such organic wholes, the parts cannot properly be understood apart from their functional relation to the whole organism, and
judgments of identity will be a function of one's perception of natural
wholes.
This is the sense in which Braine is relying upon the notion of substance throughout-as "the logical subject of concrete predicates"(256),
and not a particular philosophical notion privileging any metaphysical
viewpoint. Indeed, this strategy allows us to glimpse how he will present a non-dualistic account of sOlll, for he need not endorse "the
Kantian distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon; ... all
that is required are such things as the refusal to eliminate the category of
causal agent in favour of the categories of event and state, the refusal to
explain the notion of causal action in terms of the notion of law, the
refusal to treat laws as all of one kind as if either all or none were nonteleological in form, and the refusal to treat laws at any level as an a11determining system"(284-5). So he will insist that "teleological and
holistic ways of thinking arise without any dependence on the introduction of abstract terms such as soul or vital force or energy, or even disposition, all such abstract modes of speech being circumlocutory for talk
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about substances, that is, causal agents exercising different modes of
causality" (285). This is the sense in which he seeks to show a continuity
rather than a chasm between ascription and explanation.
Before taking up the second part of his intended argument, where he
uses the complex fact of language use to argue for human transcendence, he concludes part I with an extended treatment of the community
of human beings with other animals. This community has been evident
in many passages cited, where the reference is invariably to "human
beings and other animals;" for Braine, as for Aristotle, humans are animals who can speak: talking animals. This fact affects the ways in
which we exercise the very faculties by which we outstrip animals, and
it undergirds a non-dualist account of those functions, seeing them as
united with a "body with organsl/(336) even when a specific function
may not require an organic correlate. If we cannot "relegate the other
animals to the level of biological mechanisms," we must then "treat both
human beings and the higher animals as wholes"(339). That has been
Braine's overriding methodological presumption throughout, and it will
continue to guide him as he explores human transcendence. We should
note another concern as well, as we take stock of what has been said and
contemplate a briefer look at part II. His reliance on Aristotle as a viable
alternative to Descartes, as well as his desire to bring the work of Austin,
Ryle, and the later Wittgenstein into creative contact with more recent
attempts at explaining human action, display a some features of his
approach to philosophy. He clearly does not see philosophy in a vulgar
Hegelian way as a series of "positions" each of which replaces the other,
thereby rendering the earlier ones "obsolete." Instead he respects the
fact that the sorts of issues which we probe in philosophical inquiry are
for various reasons quite intractable. So we need all the help we can get!
Besides, presuming that later developments are in fact developments; that
is, that they can be seen as simple replacements of earlier conceptual
efforts, removes any capacity for dialogue among these views, and certainly impoverishes any current inquiry.
Moreover, such methodological warnings have substantive implications, and these would seem to form Braine's central concern. That is,
we can become so enamored of a particular method of inquiry that we
can lose sight of "chat it is we are seeking to understand. That was certainly the force of Wittgenstein's "therapeutic" approach to the very
way of posing "philosophical issues"; be sure that the questions you are
asking are rcnl questions! Braine is clearly concerned that a set of current
strategies in "philosophy of mind" may in fact be missing their subjectthe human person. We have other ways of detecting when philosophy
begins to miss its mark, of course. It shows up when we have to spend
an inordinate amount of time "motivating" our students to grapple with
the "problems" as we present them, or (as I have already noted) when
we need to caricature an alternative approach to place our preferred one
on the table. (In my area of philosophical theology, the danger signals
emerge when people wonder whether the being we are talking so much
about could ever be God? Indeed, this has moved some colleagues to
eschew all conferences on "philosophy of religion" out of respect for
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their faith in God!) It is this sense which has led Braine to have recourse
to Aristotle and to substance- or agent-causality rather than prefer a
replacement ontology of events and states. His deconstruction of that
approach was designed to ask us why we might prefer it? His constructive efforts in part II, notably with the Aristotelian notion of soul and
with its particular elaboration at the hands of Aquinas, intend to show
that there is a non-dualist way between the apparent alternatives of
Cartesian dualism and eliminative materialism.
In his remarks introducing part II, Braine reminds us once again of
his central thesis: "the mental is inextricably linked, logically and not
just causally, with the patterns of bodily behaviour in which it is reflected"(345). It is this contention which drives his holism: "if we could get
away from the false idea of animals as biological machines, and recover
the conception of an animal as an organic whole with a certain kind of
life requiring its nature and behaviour to be understood holistically, we
could regard the statement 'the human being is an animal' as precisely
capturing our central contention"(346). It is against this positive background, having critically linked materialists together with Cartesians as
dualists, that he sets out to "explore the significance of language as what
differentiates human beings from other animals"(347). His treatment of
language (in Ch. 10) is rich and provocative, yet all the while preliminary, for he has promised a full-length treatment of language to complete the triptych. It turns on the fact that "the whole working of language involves understanding at two levels, an understanding of langue
in virtue of which words or elements of speech have some meaning in
their own right and an understanding of parole or speech, which is the
exercise of the underlying understanding of lallgue"(348). The upshot of
this observation will be that a natural language must contain its own
metalanguage to do the job it does, and that those of us who regularly
make use of such languages will need to be equipped by nature to do
just that.
Those arguments will lead to his nondualist presentation of soul, a
reality which he will elaborate as Aristotle does for human beings and
for animals, with certain features specific to humans, which he attributes
to Aquinas. These signal what we have called "human transcendence,"
for Aquinas "suggested that, although the human soul has to originate
with the body and needs the body for its natural mode of functioning,
nonetheless it has an existence in its own right because it has an operation in its own right, namely, understanding" (349). David Braine feels,
however, that "for us, the primary way of suggesting this transcendence
should not be in terms of the soul existing in its own right and not by
right of the body, but in terms of the human being existing in its own
right and not by right of the body because it, the human being, has states
and operations which are not bodily"(350). The language of "soul," it
would seem, has become so infected by Cartesian dualistic perspectives
that it will invariably trigger "folk psychology" scenarios, so best leave it
to one side. Yet Braine will show how it can be employed properly, so
long as we remind ourselves, as Aquinas took pains to do as well, that
"ways of speaking about the soul are embedded and underpinned by
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ways of speaking about the human being as such"(350).
Braine's view of human language turns on its "expressiveness":
words are expressive because of the double way in which they have
meaning: lexically and in use. And both dimensions-langue and
parole-are essential and interpenetrating: "it is because the words we
use in speech ... are nodes of understanding in their own right, that
when we use them in speech they are able to express something with the
result that the speech itself expresses something"(353). The interaction
of langue and parole is displayed in the relation between words and sentences: "the sentence, its sense, and the senses of the words as functors
or as in use are all constituted in the act of utterance, as the sound of a
trill or musical sequence is constituted in the act of performance."
Hence "we say that the words express a sense, the sense of the sentence,
words and sentence having sense in the same act"(371). Yet there is a
crucial difference: "the home of the the notion of sentence is only at the
level of speech or parole, and of function"(372). It follows from this that
"the capacity to understand linguistically expressed concepts ... is not
separable from the capacity to use them rightly in judgments"(365), and
that "the fundamental mistake of most recent semantic theory [is] to
conceive a sentence as primarily a unit of langue with a settled meaning
determined by the langue-meanings of its grammatical components and
their mode of combination"(374).
Such a brief sketch can only provoke, but what Braine wishes to
evoke here is one's own sense of the open-ended-cum-unitary or integrated character of language-in-use, as we are all language users.
Moreover, "in learning and using language, our starting point is not the
identifying or picking out particular meanings ... but in each case the
understanding of the meaning of some expression"(387). That is, words
express what we want them to when we use them in sentences, and
"what is involved no more involves calculation from langue-meanings
than walking involves calculation from muscle properties and relations"(386). And if "there can be no calculation of the parole-meaning of
sentences (utterances) from the langue-meaning of elements of
langue"(390), then language use is not susceptible of computer simulation. If "there is no set of rules governing the interpretation of speechsentences utilizing a given element of langue," then we must rather
acknowledge that "the knowledge of langue is given a skilled and situation-geared use by the users of language: ... knowledge of the lallguemeaning of a word is a potential towards an indefinitely wide spread of
meanings-in-use or parole-meanings"(395). His sense of the holistic character of human agency is reflected in our use of language. And his
predilection for the term "expressive" adumbrates his extended critique
(in the following chapter) of representational accounts of thinking.
Reference is a small part of language use, subordinate to expressing
what one means. What best characterizes language use is the activity of
judgment, and our use of general concepts in judging "cannot be
explained in terms of abstract ideas as objects to the mind"(412). It is
this axial point that thinking is to be explained by reference to the activity of language use, and notably of using language to make judgments,
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which leads him to his central contention in chapter 12: that "linguistic
understanding and thinking have no bodily organ"(447).
Yet interestingly enough, while chapter 12 is entitled "the second
refutation of mechanism"(447), it does not introduce any new notions,
but rather recapitulates his reflections on language use and the kind of
subject one would have to be to "use words in an indefinite number of
logically distinguishable types of use .... The structure of [such] linguistic capacity involves a judging subject and within it structures of selfreflection and of reflection on procedures of coming to judgments. This
structure is unitary in such a way that, without these and other essential
substructures, there would be no capacity for language or linguistic
understanding or for thought in the medium of words. But there could
not be any mechanically operating system which exemplified these
structures ... (451). The set of reasons for that cluster under what he calls
"the 'allusiveness' of thought (its 'intentionality' in one sense of that
word): every utterance or thought is pregnant with the whole inter-connectedness and structure of language" (452). This "allusiveness" picks
up his insistence on the "expressiveness" of language, which displaces a
propensity to consider thinking representationally: "the possession or
use of a concept is not the bringing of an internal object (an 'idea' or representation) into relation with the object to which it is applied, but the
saying-the expressing-of something"(452). On such a view of saying
and thinking, "the occurrence of material processes precisely correlated
with the procedure of understanding and thinking becomes not only
impossible-there can be no such precise correlation-but also redundant, serving no purpose in explanation" (453). So he concludes: "the
road to understanding [the structures of langue and parole] more deeply
lies in what we may think of as the human or holistic sciences, not in
delving into the realm of material explanation" (454).
Before proceeding to his final chapters, which seek to rehabilitate the
notion of soul in a noncartesian manner, and then show how one may
either use such a notion or dispense with it to speak of the manner in
which humans may be said to transcend animals, a word of reflection on
his mode of argumentation might be in order. Braine is engaged in a
large project of sketching an alternative to currently fashionable ways of
doing philosophy of human nature, often called "philosophy of mind."
That very title is, of course, misleading if one purports to be speaking of
the kind of thing we are, and the fact that much of what goes on there
proceeds from "materialist" presumptions seems to corroborate his initial alignment of such materialists with Cartesian dualism. Yet his alternative does not rely, as does John Searle's, for example, on something
nonmaterial called "consciousness;" in fact, it deliberately eschews that
tack. Holism is not a merely honorific notion for him; it is at the heart of
his call for a mode of explanation properly fitted to its subject: human
beings. It is that call, Aristotelian in inspiration, which seems to me to
be his most constructive challenge to a fresh perspective in thinking
about human beings. For it exploits the reminders of "ordinary language philosophers" about the peculiarities endemic to ascribing things
to humans and yet links us with the larger organic world of which we
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are a part. And in doing so, it relies on our sense of ourselves, avoiding
tendentious attempts to make us think differently about who and what
we are than we are wont to do. So it seems that the persuasiveness of
his cumulative argument will depend on the manner in which he can
make that nondualist holistic alternative available to us, especially in
arguing for "human transcendence."
The final three chapters build on his conclusion to chapter 12: "it
clearly follows that the human being cannot be a mechanical system and
that, in operations involving self-reflection, including these kinds of reasoning to conclusions in natural arithmetic, the human being does not
operate as if it even might be a mechanical system. But does it also follow that mechanical processes are not internal to the procedures of
understanding and judging involved, as they are internal to the procedures of seeing, suffering emotion, and so forth"(471)? His own answer
to that question is offered explicitly as a reformulation of Aquinas' insistence "that no material faculty can reflect upon itself: ... there can be isomorphism between part of the material faculty and the whole but nothing corresponding to a judgement by the whole in regard to the wholeno reproduction in the material organism of the structure whereby the
organism in critical judgement reflects upon itself or critically (reflectively) judges"(472). It is an intuitive form of that judgment which he associates with what he calls the "concrete and phenomenological" notion of
soul, one which "is represented in the primordial agreement as to which
workings or 'operations' of the human being or animal are to be ranked
as workings or operations of soul: seeing and hearing, being pleased
and being distressed, wanting, hoping, being afraid, being angry, believing and intending, remembering, imagining and thinking, and suchlike"(481). He notes that these are "the ways of thinking which misled
Plato and Descartes, but which are not in themselves at all tied to dualism-represented in Aristotle throughout his De Anima, relied upon by
Aquinas in his demonstrations of human unity, and still drawn upon in
the sayings of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein"(482).
Yet for all that, "we know perfectly well that the human being and the
animal are proper subjects of all these operations"(487), and as Aquinas
puts it: "my soul is not I" (491). So it is no wonder that an item introduced as the subject of such significant concrete predicates could easily
be taken to be a basic entity, a substance, and so spawn the dualism
regarding human beings which makes "folk psychology" less of a caricature. And this is particularly true in human beings, of course, as the
gathering tendency of David Braine's cumulative arguments focuses on
the subject of certain operations which are not usefully understood in
material terms. If this subject were "the soul" then we seem effectively
launched into a dualist conception of human beings. So Braine takes
pains to try to restore us to Aristotle: "the soul ... is an 'as-if-substance' -a quasi-substance" (490). That is, it seems to arise spontaneously as we consider our intentional activities, yet "it" is not thereby something to which we have privileged access. So nothing "epistemologically private [or] subjective" follows from our using the term: '''souls' are
not parts of mythology, but elements in a dramatic idiom of speech
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which we can understand whether or not we adopt it"(495). Moreover,
if we allow ourselves to be so spooked by Cartesian pre-conceptions as
to eschew the idiom completely, then remarks like "Wittgenstein's ...
that 'The human body is the best picture of the human soul' and 'My
attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul' ... read like unintelligible archaisms"(496).
So what needs to be done is to recover the phenomenological, "as-if"
character of soul-talk, and note how it can be integrated with Aristotle's
conception of soul as lithe form of a living bodily thing, lwhichl of itself
constitutes a scandal to materialism. For it means that the physicsincluding here the chemistry, physiology, and even neurology-of living
bodies is only an abstraction, the separating out for attention, of just one
aspect of a reality which is not merely physical in the modern
sense"(498). A perspective of that sort reminds us of the writings of
Oliver Sacks and orients us to the sense of Braine's "holism," so allowing us to see better what is going on in this primordial language of soul.
It also offers us a way of resolving what seems to be a tension with
Aquinas' insistence that the human soul is a candidate for subsisting "in
its own right" by virtue of humans' being the subject of operations
which need not involve the body internally. For he will also insist that
"the soul as subject of intellection is none other than the form of the
body conceived in an Aristotelian way"(503), and he must do so to
assure the unity of the human being. What happens in this privileged
human case is that the Aristotelian notion of form-itself a "formal
notion"(511)-assumes a specific kind of reference tailored to the transcendence proper to human beings.
And if that response sounds unsatisfying, there is another tack one
can take: bypass the language of soul altogether as an explanatory language, and go to the source of Aquinas' recasting of Aristotelian substance in terms of essence and existence. That is, we mayor may not be
able to recover the primordial or phenomenological language of soul,
and so it may not prove particularly useful to invoke its Aristotelian
explanatory side either. This entire enterprise may involve too great an
effort to recover a familiarity with Aristotelian or Thomist technical language as well. Braine has already suggested that such efforts are not
required, since is it the human being, after all, who is the authentic subject of those operations which bespeak transcendence. So Braine moves
in the final chapter to recover a "positive" notion of existence-lithe
existing of a substance as an actuality in the world always consists in
some activity"(535)-recapitulating themes he developed in his earlier
book." If "substances are the primary subjects of existence and this in
virtue of being subjects of predicates ascribing action or activity" -the
thesis prevailing throughout this work, what he is now saying "is that
this existing of substances is itself an 'activity', 'going on', or 'actualit y"'(536). To be sure, "not an action or act predicated of what exists but
presupposed to any predication"(537). That is to say, existence is not to
be thought of as a minimal floor, an "off/on" concept, as might have
been suggested to many on the pattern of the so-called "existential operator," but rather analogously realizes different kinds of beings. So it is
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that existing is correlated with essence, but given primacy in the correlation, and so referred to suggestively as "activity" or "actuality." And
since the actions proper to things follow their mode of existing, and
"some of the activities of the human being ... are ones which do not
involve the body, ... it follows that the human being has an esse [or manner of existing] which transcends the body"(538). Such, in brief, is
Braine's argument to human transcendence which obviates any need to
speak of "soul," yet which can also "explain and underpin [the] earlier
way of speaking about souls"(541). For this metaphysical idiom incorporates bodily existence integrally; as it concludes "that there comes to
be in the coming to be of a human being a principle of activity which is a
focalized subject, which has an esse which transcends the body, and
which, therefore, does not cease at death," it asserts in the same breath
that "the human being has no identity apart from its origin and history"(542).
Despite the difficulty of negotiating this book-a difficulty endemic
to the vast scope of the subject it essays, and enhanced by a formidable
style of composition-the effort is wondrously rewarded. For he has
dared to challenge modes of explanation which have acquired a certain
settled legitimacy, and done so not merely by calling them into question,
but also attempted to show why they might have appeared attractive for
want of an alternative. That alternative he has sketched in considerable
detail, and promises an even greater elaboration of his central constructive arguments about language in a forthcoming volume, tentatively
entitled "The Expressiveness of Words: the key to the nature of language." There would seem to be a vast realm to be explored between
the polar positions of dualism and materialism, and Braine has begun
that exploration with us. It becomes all the more crucial to carry it on
the more we are persuaded by his initial argument portraying both
polarities as sharing a common dualistic mentality. A finge benefit for
students is the way in which he introduces them to classical philosophical notions in a quite contemporary idiom.
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NOTES
1. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.
2. At this point I was reminded of another bugbear with which a group
of revisionist philosophical theologians had confronted me some years back,
called "classical theism." That was an exceedingly flat-footed reading of
some people who had taught me a lot, and had even helped to shape our
western accounts of divinity, whose work-suitably caricatured-had supposedly contributed more than any other cultural fact to the "death of God"
in western intellectual life. Those who shaped the caricature promised a
new lifeline for "theism" in something they presented as "process theology." The movement lasted about 25 years and now seems to have evaporated. But what continued to depress me about it when it was in vogue was
the way in which it relied on a caricature to get things started. That not only
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kept certain questions from arising properly, but had the even worse effect
of releasing graduate students from the need to become in any way adept in
that presumably discredited way of thinking. I couldn't help but think of
them as having been shortchanged.
3. " ... before mental states and events can be identified with brain-states
or events, or regarded as 'realized in the brain', these mental states and
events have to be conceived in a way which makes them purely 'inner', logically segregated from the 'outer world' and the 'outer man' with his behaviour in the way which is characteristic of dualism"(23).
4. Bill Moyers' recent series on PBS: "Healing and the Mind" focused
some of these indicators.
5. He distances his account from that of John Searle, who while he
"may boldly declare that 'perception is an Intentional and causal transaction
between mind and the world' [Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983),49] and that 'action, like perception, is a causal
Intentional transaction between mind and the world'[Jbid., 88], but it
emerges that in each case we have two components, an Intentional component (the visual experience or experience of acting) and a physical component between which there is to be a causal relation" (103).
6. The Reality of Time and the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1988) 108-112, 138-161; see my review in Faith and Philosophy 7 (1990) 362-65.

